



About EPOCH Investment Partners

COMPANY OVERVIEW Epoch Investment Partners was founded in April 2004 by experienced professionals who foresaw a significant change in both the drivers of investment returns and the structure of investment management firms. Following almost 20 years of expanding P/E ratios, interest rates bottomed in June 2003 and were poised to begin rising, thereby eliminating P/E ratios as the major driver of total equity returns as was the case over the 1980–2000 period. Free cash flow and its intelligent use for shareholder value creation will replace earnings as the dominant explanatory variable of investment returns. In addition, shareholder yield will regain its historical role as a significant contributor to total return.

Whereas clarity of investment processes has always been relevant to investors, a similar demand will be made of an investment firm's business practices. In view of the events that occurred at the turn of this century reflecting inadequate institutional oversight at the corporate accounting and regulatory levels, greater transparency of conduct and business processes are required. As a result, we chose to become a public company with all of its rigorous disclosure requirements. There can be no greater transparency requirement than that of being public.

We are a well capitalized and stable firm composed of experienced people. Partners and Directors own 58% of our Company. It is our intention that all employees own stock of the firm. Ownership is a shared value that binds us together in the pursuit of value creation for our clients.

INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY All services are created in a manner consistent with our firm's investment philosophy. At Epoch, we desire to produce superior risk adjusted returns by building portfolios of businesses with outstanding risk/reward profiles without running a high degree of capital risk. We analyze a business in the same manner a private investor would in looking to purchase the entire company and only invest in those businesses we understand and where we have confidence in their financial statements. We seek businesses that generate "free cash flow" and securities that have unrecognized potential yet possess a combination of above average yield, above average free cash flow growth, and/or below average valuation.

Our goal is to produce an efficient portfolio on a risk/return basis. At the heart of portfolio construction is diversification. We diversify across attractive sectors, limit individual holding sizes, and have a strict sell discipline with low portfolio turnover. If we have identified a "good business" at a "good price," time is our ally as patient investors.

INVESTMENT PROCESS

Analyze the Business - Determine the sustainability of the business, drivers of earnings, barriers to entry, and competitive advantages.

Understand the Cash Flow Structure - Focus on companies generating cash earnings and assess the quality and character of those earnings to determine the net cash flow from the business.

Relate Cash Flow to Enterprise Value - Examine relevant claims against that net cash flow and determine their necessity to maintain and grow the business. Evaluate how management will use this "free cash flow"; value the cash flow stream and compare it to enterprise value to determine the attractiveness of the investment.

Management Quality - Identify management with a reputation and demonstrated ability to create shareholder value.

Seek Unrecognized Assets - Identify, where possible, hidden, undervalued or underutilized assets, especially in small and mid cap companies where many companies are under-researched.

Our services differ from one another largely due to differences within the universe of securities eligible for purchase and portfolio construction techniques appropriate for creation of rich profiles sought by the client.

Founding Partners



WILLIAM W. PRIEST
CEO, CIO & Portfolio Manager

Bill's experience includes serving as a Co-Managing Partner and Portfolio Manager at Steinberg Priest & Sloane Capital Management, LLC. Prior to that he spent 30 years at Credit Suisse Asset Management (CSAM) and its predecessor firm, BEA Associates, which he co-founded in 1972. Bill has an outstanding reputation as an industry CEO and portfolio manager. He is also the author of several published articles on investing and finance, including his most recent book, Free Cash Flow and Shareholder Yield: New Priorities for the Global Investor, published by John Wiley & Sons.



TIMOTHY T. TAUSSIG
President & COO

Tim was Chief Operating Officer of Trident Investment Management, LLC, ("Trident") a global hedge fund and a sub-advisor to a mutual fund for non-U.S. equity mandates. At Trident he was responsible for the firm's business, operations, and marketing requirements. Prior to Trident, he was Managing Director and Member of the Global Executive Committee for Credit Suisse Asset Management (CSAM) and Co-Head of Marketing for CSAM worldwide and its predecessor firm, BEA Associates, which he joined in 1985.



J. PHILIP CLARK
Executive Vice President & Head of Client Relations

Phil, a 17 year veteran of Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., was National Managing Director of Bernstein's private client business where he frequently spoke at the firm's Client and Professional Conferences. Previously, he was Managing Director of Bernstein's Institutional Asset Management business and initiated and managed Bernstein's successful sub-advisory business.




DAVID N. PEARL
Executive Vice President, Head of U.S. Equities & Portfolio Manager

David was a Managing Director and Portfolio Manager at Steinberg Priest & Sloane Capital Management, LLC. Previously, he held a similar portfolio management position at ING Furman Selz Asset Management. He also founded and managed Sagacity International Ltd, a long/short hedge fund. Prior to that, he was a Senior Portfolio Manager at Citibank Global Asset Management where he ranked in the top decile of his peer group.

Assets Under Management

Total: \$6,001 Million



■ U.S. All Cap Value/Balanced	\$1,395
■ Global Equity Shareholder Yield	\$1,323
■ U.S. Value	\$1,155
■ U.S. Small/SMID Cap Value	\$1,009
■ International	\$688
■ Absolute Return	\$259
■ Global Small Cap Value	\$173

Subtotals in millions, as of 6/30/2007
May not add due to rounding

Performance Second Quarter 2007

	Inception Date	2Q 2007	YTD	Annualized Returns					Risk Statistics - Since Inception ¹								
				1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	10 Years	Since Inception	Std Dev.	Sharpe Ratio	Inform. Ratio	Alpha	Beta	R ²			
US ALL CAP VALUE	7/31/1994																
Epoch Gross Return		6.3	8.8	21.5	15.9	17.2	12.7	15.1	10.6	1.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Epoch Net Return		6.0	8.3	20.3	14.8	16.1	11.6	14.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Russell 3000		5.8	7.1	20.1	12.4	11.5	7.6	11.7	14.3	0.6	0.4	6.1	0.6	0.6			
Russell 3000 Value		4.7	6.0	21.3	15.9	13.4	10.0	13.2	13.1	0.7	0.2	4.7	0.7	0.7			
US VALUE	7/31/2001																
Epoch Gross Return		6.8	9.8	24.4	17.2	14.4	NA	9.9	10.3	0.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Epoch Net Return		6.5	9.2	23.2	16.0	13.3	NA	8.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Russell 1000		5.9	7.2	20.4	12.3	11.3	NA	6.2	12.9	0.3	0.6	4.5	0.7	0.8			
Russell 1000 Value		4.9	6.2	21.9	15.9	13.3	NA	9.4	12.4	0.6	0.1	2.2	0.7	0.8			
S&P 500		6.3	7.0	20.6	11.7	10.7	NA	5.6	12.9	0.3	0.7	5.0	0.7	0.8			
US SMALL CAP VALUE	12/31/2002																
Epoch Gross Return		8.3	12.0	23.5	15.0	NA	NA	18.8	9.7	1.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Epoch Net Return		8.0	11.5	22.2	13.9	NA	NA	17.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Russell 2000		4.4	6.5	16.4	13.5	NA	NA	20.3	14.1	1.2	(0.2)	5.2	0.6	0.7			
Russell 2000 Value		2.3	3.8	16.1	15.0	NA	NA	21.4	13.0	1.4	(0.4)	3.8	0.6	0.7			
US CHOICE	4/30/2005																
Epoch Gross Return		7.1	10.2	24.8	NA	NA	NA	18.6	8.7	1.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Epoch Net Return		6.7	9.4	22.9	NA	NA	NA	16.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Russell 3000		5.8	7.1	20.1	NA	NA	NA	15.8	7.2	1.5	0.6	2.6	1.0	0.7			
INTERNATIONAL SMALL CAP	1/31/2005																
Epoch Gross Return		5.4	14.1	36.7	NA	NA	NA	32.6	12.6	2.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Epoch Net Return		5.1	13.5	35.2	NA	NA	NA	31.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
S&P/Citigroup EMI EPAC Index		5.4	12.4	32.0	NA	NA	NA	26.5	10.3	2.0	1.6	1.5	1.2	0.9			
MSCI EAFE Small Cap (Net)		4.2	11.6	25.2	NA	NA	NA	23.0	11.1	1.6	2.2	7.0	1.1	0.9			
GLOBAL SMALL CAP VALUE²	12/31/2002																
Epoch Gross Return		6.3	12.9	29.4	21.4	NA	NA	24.4	9.7	2.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Epoch Net Return		6.0	12.3	28.0	20.1	NA	NA	23.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
S&P/Citigroup EMI World Index		5.9	11.9	26.2	21.7	NA	NA	26.5	11.1	1.9	(0.5)	2.1	0.8	0.9			
GLOBAL CHOICE	9/30/2005																
Epoch Gross Return		8.2	13.6	35.7	NA	NA	NA	29.4	10.5	2.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Epoch Net Return		7.8	12.7	33.7	NA	NA	NA	27.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MSCI World (Gross)		6.7	9.5	24.2	NA	NA	NA	19.3	7.3	1.9	1.7	5.6	1.2	0.7			
GLOBAL EQUITY SHAREHOLDER YIELD	12/31/2005																
Epoch Gross Return		4.4	8.5	28.8	NA	NA	NA	23.8	7.0	2.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Epoch Net Return		4.1	7.9	27.4	NA	NA	NA	22.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
S&P/Citigroup BMI World Index		6.8	9.9	24.4	NA	NA	NA	20.7	7.3	2.0	0.8	5.2	0.8	0.7			
GLOBAL ABSOLUTE RETURN	12/31/2001																
Epoch Gross Return		6.7	11.7	25.5	20.0	22.5	NA	18.9	9.8	1.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Epoch Net Return		6.3	10.8	23.7	18.2	20.7	NA	17.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
S&P 500		6.3	7.0	20.6	11.7	10.7	NA	6.9	12.1	0.4	1.2	13.8	0.5	0.4			
MSCI World (Gross)		6.7	9.5	24.2	17.3	14.5	NA	11.3	12.1	0.7	0.8	11.5	0.5	0.4			
Lehman U.S. Aggregate		(0.5)	1.0	6.1	4.0	4.5	NA	4.8	3.7	0.6	1.3	17.0	(0.2)	0.0			

See page 4 for performance disclosure. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

¹ The information provided is supplemental information only and supplements the Composite presentation which is located in the Performance Disclosure section of the End Notes.

² Effective 5/2007, the benchmark was changed from the MSCI World (Gross) Index to the S&P Citigroup EMI World Index as it is more representative of the composite's investment strategy. This change has been applied retroactively.

“Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts.” - Albert Einstein

By William W. Priest, CEO, CIO and Portfolio Manager

This quote was a favorite of Einstein's: it hung on the wall of his office at Princeton University, and it guided his approach to some of the most complex scientific, spiritual and philosophical problems of the modern age. If he was alive today, he might also find it applicable to the current state of the investment markets.

From a quantitative standpoint, today's investment landscape contains many encouraging features. Equity market returns in the first half of this year have been consistent with the forecasts of many industry pundits, who have predicted high single digit returns for the stock market (+7.1% for the Russell 3000, and +9.9% for BMI World Index). With the recent upward shift in the interest rate curve, bond returns have been negative, but only slightly so. P/E ratios are over 17 and, given earnings forecasts for 2008, are just over 15 for next year. China continues to grow at an annualized rate of 10% while growth in the U.S. plods along at an annualized rate of 2.4%. Although the housing market in the U.S. is suffering a cyclical downturn, it has yet to greatly impact consumer spending. In fact, consumer spending increased 2.1% for the first half of the year, supported in part by a 1.6% rise in wages and employment gains of 871,000 for the six months through June. As long as China rolls along at its current growth rate of 10% and the U.S. consumer continues to spend, any recession forecaster is likely to be disappointed.

That is the “stuff” that can be counted. And, taken at face value, it seems to indicate a relatively benign, if not surprisingly stable, financial outlook. But Einstein's truism begs the question: what about the hidden, “uncounted” elements of today's economy? And do they “count” more than the encouraging data that exists on the surface?

To our faithful readers, it will come as no surprise that our answer to this question begins with interest rates. Nothing is more important in finance than interest rates. At present, they are going up; and their continued ascent is the “uncounted” yet all-important key to discerning the true nature of today's investment landscape. With interest rates ratcheting up around the world, credit spreads are widening and all areas of debt financing are beginning to be affected. It is akin to draining the swamp and watching the alligators appear. Presently, we can already see the “alligators” in the mortgage market: particularly the sub prime and Alt-A mortgage space. As interest rates continue to rise, high yield bonds and covenant lite loans will take the hit, especially for banks that have enabled private equity firms to finance deals at increasing high cash flow multiples. On this front, the projected losses are staggering: according to one source, mortgage lenders are already \$210 billion in the red. This deficit is sure to multiply when the “alligators” sink their teeth into the commercial banks, where mortgages currently comprise 55% of total bank loans.¹

A good example of the “uncounted” mattering more than the “counted” is the case of the dramatic and much-publicized collapse of two funds at Bear Stearns. The failure of these funds is eerily reminiscent of the Long Term Capital fiasco. In the Bear Stearns funds, leverage was present in spades: the more leveraged of the two funds – the High Grade Structured Credit Enhanced Leveraged Fund – had less than \$700 million of capital supporting \$12 billion of assets. A little rise in interest rates, a little increment to credit risk...and *shazam!* The fund was toast.

The demise of Bear's broker-dealer sponsored funds was also hastened by an additional “uncounted” factor: its holdings were marked to “model,” not to market. According to performance data from several indices, sub prime loans with this characteristic have declined 50% this year: the ABX index², for example, was 97 in January and now rests at 52. The performance of Bear's most ill-fated fund shows a similar trajectory. For April, the fund's shareholders were informed of a 6% decline; two weeks later, this number was revised to “down 18%.” “Marking to model,” therefore, sowed the seeds of this fund's demise by leaving the fund's true market value unheeded and “uncounted.”

Debt vehicles of the “mark to model” variety may also display another crucial yet “uncounted” characteristic: the separation of the originator of the loan from the ultimate owner of the loan. When this is the case, due diligence processes go out the window at the point of inception. The recent *Wall Street Journal* article, “How Wall Street Stoked the Mortgage Meltdown,” is instructive in this regard.³ It describes how, as a result of minimal-to-nonexistent due diligence efforts, a loan officer submitted a loan on a duplex that a subsequent lawsuit stated was neither a home nor a duplex but a greenhouse!

The problems associated with the debt market's “uncounted” phenomena – the ability to influence prices of portfolio holdings through “mark to model” formulas, and the lack of due diligence practices at the point of loan origination – have surfaced because cheap money is ending. Figure 1 below shows the twenty year history of interest rate spreads between lower credit bonds and U.S. Treasuries. With a glance, the reader can see what is sure to happen next, even though it cannot yet be “counted” (spreads will widen).

The private equity world is another victim of the “uncounted” forces under discussion. The features of today's debt market have resulted in too much money chasing too few goods. Figure 2 illustrates the leverage and debt coverage ratios for LBO's with EBITDA over \$50 million. Interest coverage ratios are approaching ten year lows as debt to EBITDA climbs to ten year highs. Is the Blackstone offering the canary in the coal mine? We think so.

Figure 1⁴





Figure 2⁵



In summary, we believe the “uncounted” elements of today's marketplace are far more indicative of our true economic reality than those that can be “counted.” Interest rate credit spreads will widen, many “mark to model” financial instruments will become worthless, and the private equity bubble is already starting to hiss. None of these factors can be quantified by traditional financial analysis, but all of them have a profound impact on the health and stability of the debt and equity markets. We agree with Einstein: data alone cannot give us a full picture of how our world operates. This is especially true in the current investment landscape. While much quantitative data points to a resilient and profitable marketplace, there is a wealth of qualitative evidence that should alert the informed investor to potential trouble on the horizon.

In the meantime, we continue to recommend our long-term strategy of free cash flow-based investing. The recipe is simple: identify companies that generate free cash flow every year and use it wisely to benefit shareholders. Believe it or not, many of these stocks are available at reasonable prices. In our opinion, this investment philosophy should weather market forces of all kinds: positive or negative, subtle or dramatic, “counted” or “uncounted.”

¹ Abelson, Alan, “Truly AI-ARM-ing,” *Barron's*, July 9, 2007.

² ABX.HE Index reflects prices of securitization backed by home equity loans and was designed to reference the sub-prime equity sector.

³ Hudson, Michael, “How Wall Street Stoked the Mortgage Meltdown,” *The Wall Street Journal* June 27, 2007.

⁴ Rattner, Steven, “The Coming Credit Meltdown,” *The Wall Street Journal* June 18, 2007, A17.

⁵ “Cyclical Litmus Test,” *Grant's Interest Rate Observer* 25-13 (2007):10.

Key Personnel

ADAM BORAK
Chief Financial Officer
UPenn, Wharton School, BS
Years experience: 18

RONAN J. BURKE
Public Funds Relations Director
Dublin City University, BBS
Years experience: 20

J. PHILIP CLARK
Executive Vice President & Head of Client Relations
Yale University, BS
Years experience: 26

DINA DICENSO, Ph.D.
Senior Associate & Analyst
University of Arizona, BA
Northeastern University, MSF
Fordham University, Ph.D.
Years experience: 9

JOSEPH W. DONALDSON, CPA
Associate Portfolio Manager & Senior Analyst
University of Georgia, BBA
Columbia University, MBA
Years experience: 22

DANIEL GEBER
Portfolio Manager & Senior Analyst
UCLA, BS
Stanford University, MBA
Years experience: 22

ANDREA TASKER GLOGOFF
Consultant Relations Director
Colgate University, BA
Years experience: 13

KENNETH N. HIGHTOWER, Ph.D.
Director, Quantitative Research & Risk Management
University of North Carolina, BA, Ph.D.
Years experience: 10

THOMAS HU
Senior Associate, Quantitative Research
National Taiwan University, BS; LL.B
Columbia University, MS
Years experience: 4

JANET K. NAVON
Portfolio Management & Senior Analyst
Georgetown University, BS
Columbia University, MBA
Years experience: 26

DAVID N. PEARL
Executive Vice President, Head of U.S. Equities & Portfolio Manager
UPenn, BS
Stanford University, MBA
Years experience: 24

TOM PERNICE
Client Service Director
Stony Brook University, BA
Years experience: 26

WILLIAM W. PRIEST, CFA, CPA
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Duke University, BA
Wharton School, MBA
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Pace University, MBA
Years experience: 21

TIMOTHY T. TAUSSIG
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Analyst
New York University, BS
Wharton School, MBA
Years experience: 11

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Wilkes University, BS
Harvard University, MS
Years experience: 7

JEFFREY M. ULNESS
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University of ND, JD & BA
Georgetown University, LL.M.
Years experience: 21

RICHARD WATT
Global Portfolio Management
University of Edinburgh, MA
Years experience: 25

MICHAEL A. WELHOELTER, CFA
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Colgate University, BA
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T. JON WILLIAMS, Ph.D., CFA
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UCLA, Ph.D.
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CHRIS WOLTERS, CFA
Senior Analyst
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New York University, MBA
Years experience: 17

1. Presentation of the Firm—Epoch Investment Partners, Inc. became a registered investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 in June, 2004. Performance for prior periods is for Epoch's investment team and accounts while at Steinberg Priest & Sloane Capital Management, LLC. For the period 7/94 through 3/01 Bill Priest managed the accounts while at Credit Suisse Asset Management and was the only individual responsible for selecting the securities to buy and sell. Epoch Investment Partners has the books and records supporting the performance of this track record and will provide these records upon request. Epoch Investment Partners, Inc. claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®).
2. Composite Structure—Epoch's Composites include all tax-exempt and taxable portfolios above \$500,000 in size and are generally managed relative to applicable market index. Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Portfolios within the U.S. Small Cap Value Composite are managed relative to broad small cap index such as Russell 2000 Total Return Index; portfolios within the U.S. Value Composite are focused on the full capitalization range of the U.S. equity market and are managed relative to a broad market index such as the S&P 500 Index or the Russell 1000; portfolios within the Balanced Composite are managed relative to a combined stock/bond index such as 50% S&P 500 and 50% Lehman U.S. Aggregate; portfolios within the Global Small Cap composite are generally managed relative to S&P/Citigroup EMI World Index; and portfolios within the U.S. All Cap Value are managed relative to the R3000 index which approximates 98% of the total U.S. Equity market (Effective 7/1/06, the U.S. All Cap Value Composite has been redefined to reflect only those discretionary accounts managed by the All Cap Value Team and following the respective All Cap Value model. As a result, all accounts which are not managed by the All Cap Value Team and have specified client risk preferences have been removed.); and portfolios within the Global Absolute Return Composite are generally compared to broad market indices such as the S&P 500, Lehman U.S. Aggregate, and MSCI World Index (Gross).
3. Composite Creation Dates—U.S. All Cap Value, Balanced, Global Absolute Return, Global Small Cap Value, U.S. Small Cap Value, U.S. Value: June 2004; International Small Cap: February 2005; U.S. Choice: May 2005; Global Choice: October 2005; Global Equity Shareholder Yield: January 2006.
4. Risk Statistics source—Epoch Investment Partners. The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year. Sharpe ratio is a measure of absolute risk adjusted return developed by Professor William Sharpe. It divides the excess return of an account above cash returns by the Standard Deviation of the excess return to determine

- the reward per unit of risk. Information Ratio is measure of relative risk-adjusted return. It is determined by dividing excess return by Tracking Error. Alpha is a measurement of the expected residual return adjusted for the account Beta. Beta is a quantitative measure of the volatility of the account relative to the account benchmark. R-squared is a measure of how closely an account's performance correlates with the performance of the account benchmark, ranging from 0, indicating no correlation, to 1, indicating perfect correlation. Market Statistics source: Standard & Poor's, Frank Russell Company, Morgan Stanley Capital International, Lehman Brothers and Epoch Investment Partners, Inc. Composite-level risk statistics are calculated using monthly rates-of-return. Statistics calculated using a sample of less than 36 months can be considered a less reliable estimate of the characteristic's true value.
5. Total Return Methodology and Fee Structure—Returns are presented gross and net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Composite performance [Global Absolute Return, Global Small Cap Value, International Small Cap, Global Choice, Global Equity Shareholder Yield] is presented net of foreign withholding taxes on dividends, interest income, and capital gains. Withholding taxes may vary according to the investor's domicile. Returns may include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. A fee schedule is an integral part of a complete presentation and is described in Part II of the firm's ADV, which is available upon request. Net of fee returns reflect the deduction of the highest annual management fee, payable quarterly in arrears. Net-of-fee performance reflects the compounding effect of such fees. Generally, the highest fee payable for an Epoch managed equity portfolio is 1.0 % of assets, annually, with the exception of Global and Non-U.S. which is 1.1% and Absolute Return which is 1.5% of assets.
 6. Significant Cashflow Policy - Effective January 1, 2006, our significant cash flow policy has been redefined in excess of 25% of the portfolio market value. This policy amendment will not be applied retroactively. Prior to January 1, 2006, composite policy required the temporary removal of any portfolio incurring a client initiated significant cash inflow or outflow of 10% or greater of portfolio market value. The temporary removal of such an account occurs at the beginning of the month in which the significant cash flow occurs and the account re-enters the composite the next full month (assuming the cash flow has been fully invested - as determined by Epoch Investment Partners, Inc.). This policy is not applied to the advised Epoch mutual funds (within the U.S. All Cap Value, International Small Cap and Global Equity Shareholder Yield Composites), U.S. Choice, Global Choice and SMID Value Composites. Additional information regarding the treatment of significant cash flows is available upon request.
 7. Different methods can be applied to the calculation of performance data. Periods over one year are annualized. Additional information regarding policies for calculating and reporting returns is available upon request.
 8. Past performance is not indicative of future results. All information is calculated in USD\$. An account could incur losses as well as gains.
 9. To receive a complete list and description of Epoch Investment Partners, Inc. composites and/or presentation that adheres to the GIPS® standards, contact Jason Root at 212-303-7200, or write Epoch Investment Partners Inc., 640 Fifth Avenue, 18th Floor, New York, NY 10019, or send an email to info@eipny.com.

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