



## About EPOCH Investment Partners

**COMPANY OVERVIEW** Epoch Investment Partners was founded in April 2004 by experienced professionals who foresaw a significant change in both the drivers of investment returns and the structure of investment management firms. Following almost 20 years of expanding P/E ratios, interest rates bottomed in June 2003 and were poised to begin rising, thereby eliminating P/E ratios as the major driver of total equity returns as was the case over the 1980–2000 period. Free cash flow and its intelligent use for shareholder value creation will replace earnings as the dominant explanatory variable of investment returns. In addition, shareholder yield will regain its historical role as a significant contributor to total return.

Whereas clarity of investment processes has always been relevant to investors, a similar demand will be made of an investment firm's business practices. In view of the events that occurred at the turn of this century reflecting inadequate institutional oversight at the corporate accounting and regulatory levels, greater transparency of conduct and business processes are required. As a result, we chose to become a public company with all of its rigorous disclosure requirements. There can be no greater transparency requirement than that of being public.

We are a well capitalized and stable firm composed of experienced people. Partners and Directors own 58% of our Company. It is our intention that all employees own stock of the firm. Ownership is a shared value that binds us together in the pursuit of value creation for our clients.

**INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY** All services are created in a manner consistent with our firm's investment philosophy. At Epoch, we desire to produce superior risk adjusted returns by building portfolios of businesses with outstanding risk/reward profiles without running a high degree of capital risk. We analyze a business in the same manner a private investor would in looking to purchase the entire company and only invest in those businesses we understand and where we have confidence in their financial statements. We seek businesses that generate "free cash flow" and securities that have unrecognized potential yet possess a combination of above average yield, above average free cash flow growth, and/or below average valuation.

Our goal is to produce an efficient portfolio on a risk/return basis. At the heart of portfolio construction is diversification. We diversify across attractive sectors, limit individual holding sizes, and have a strict sell discipline with low portfolio turnover. If we have identified a "good business" at a "good price," time is our ally as patient investors.

### INVESTMENT PROCESS

*Analyze the Business* - Determine the sustainability of the business, drivers of earnings, barriers to entry, and competitive advantages.

*Understand the Cash Flow Structure* - Focus on companies generating cash earnings and assess the quality and character of those earnings to determine the net cash flow from the business.

*Relate Cash Flow to Enterprise Value* - Examine relevant claims against that net cash flow and determine their necessity to maintain and grow the business. Evaluate how management will use this "free cash flow"; value the cash flow stream and compare it to enterprise value to determine the attractiveness of the investment.


*Management Quality* - Identify management with a reputation and demonstrated ability to create shareholder value.

*Seek Unrecognized Assets* - Identify, where possible, hidden, undervalued or underutilized assets, especially in small and mid cap companies where many companies are under-researched.

Our services differ from one another largely due to differences within the universe of securities eligible for purchase and portfolio construction techniques appropriate for creation of rich profiles sought by the client.

### Assets Under Management

**Total: \$ 6,198 Million**



■ Global Equity Shareholder Yield	\$ 1,452
■ U.S. All Cap Value/Balanced	\$ 1,430
■ U.S. Value	\$ 1,332
■ U.S. Small/SMID Cap Value	\$ 769
■ International	\$ 723
■ Absolute Return	\$ 347
■ Global Small Cap	\$ 145

Subtotals in millions, as of 3/31/2008  
May not total due to rounding

## Founding Partners



**WILLIAM W. PRIEST**  
CEO, CIO & PORTFOLIO MANAGER

Bill's experience includes serving as a Co-Managing Partner and Portfolio Manager at Steinberg Priest & Sloane Capital Management, LLC. Prior to that he spent 30 years at Credit Suisse Asset Management (CSAM) and its predecessor firm, BEA Associates, which he co-founded in 1972. Bill has an outstanding reputation as an industry CEO and portfolio manager. He is also the author of several published articles on investing and finance, including his most recent book, Free Cash Flow and Shareholder Yield: New Priorities for the Global Investor, published by John Wiley & Sons.



**TIMOTHY T. TAUSSIG**  
PRESIDENT & COO

Tim was Chief Operating Officer of Trident Investment Management, LLC, ("Trident") a global hedge fund and a sub-advisor to a mutual fund for non-U.S. equity mandates. At Trident he was responsible for the firm's business, operations, and marketing requirements. Prior to Trident, he was Managing Director and Member of the Global Executive Committee for Credit Suisse Asset Management (CSAM) and Co-Head of Marketing for CSAM worldwide and its predecessor firm, BEA Associates, which he joined in 1985.



**J. PHILIP CLARK**  
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT  
& HEAD OF CLIENT RELATIONS

Phil, a 17 year veteran of Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., was National Managing Director of Bernstein's private client business where he frequently spoke at the firm's Client and Professional Conferences. Previously, he was Managing Director of Bernstein's Institutional Asset Management business and initiated and managed Bernstein's successful sub-advisory business.



**DAVID N. PEARL**  
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, HEAD  
OF U.S. EQUITIES & PORTFOLIO MANAGER

David was a Managing Director and Portfolio Manager at Steinberg Priest & Sloane Capital Management, LLC. Previously, he held a similar portfolio management position at ING Furman Selz Asset Management. He also founded and managed Sagacity International Ltd, a long/short hedge fund. Prior to that, he was a Senior Portfolio Manager at Citibank Global Asset Management where he ranked in the top decile of his peer group.

# Performance First Quarter 2008

	Inception Date	Annualized Returns						Risk Statistics - Since Inception <sup>1</sup>					
		1Q 2008	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	10 Years	Since Inception	Std Dev.	Sharpe Ratio	Inform. Ratio	Alpha	Beta	R <sup>2</sup>
<b>US ALL CAP VALUE</b>	08/1994												
Epoch Gross Return		(7.9)	(0.3)	8.3	15.7	9.7	13.7	10.7	0.9	-	-	-	-
Epoch Net Return		(8.2)	(1.3)	7.2	14.6	8.6	12.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Russell 3000		(9.5)	(6.1)	6.1	12.1	3.9	10.0	14.2	0.4	0.4	7.2	0.6	0.7
Russell 3000 Value		(8.5)	(10.6)	5.9	13.8	5.6	11.2	13.1	0.5	0.3	6.0	0.7	0.7
<b>US VALUE</b>	08/2001												
Epoch Gross Return		(9.7)	1.4	9.8	15.8	-	7.9	10.5	0.5	-	-	-	-
Epoch Net Return		(9.9)	0.4	8.7	14.7	-	6.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Russell 1000		(9.5)	(5.4)	6.2	11.9	-	3.7	12.7	0.1	0.7	5.1	0.7	0.8
Russell 1000 Value		(8.7)	(10.0)	6.0	13.7	-	5.9	12.3	0.3	0.3	3.5	0.7	0.8
S&P 500		(9.4)	(5.1)	5.9	11.3	-	3.2	12.7	0.0	0.8	5.5	0.7	0.8
<b>US SMID CAP VALUE</b>	09/2006												
Epoch Gross Return		(13.2)	(9.3)	-	-	-	1.3	11.8	(0.3)	-	-	-	-
Epoch Net Return		(13.4)	(10.2)	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Russell 2500		(9.4)	(11.3)	-	-	-	0.7	11.2	(0.3)	0.2	0.7	1.0	0.9
Russell 2500 Value		(7.2)	(16.5)	-	-	-	(3.3)	10.9	(0.7)	0.6	4.7	0.9	0.8
<b>US SMALL CAP VALUE</b>	01/2003												
Epoch Gross Return		(13.1)	(9.5)	4.1	13.4	-	12.0	11.2	0.8	-	-	-	-
Epoch Net Return		(13.3)	(10.4)	3.1	12.3	-	10.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Russell 2000		(9.9)	(13.0)	5.1	14.9	-	13.1	14.6	0.7	(0.2)	2.9	0.7	0.8
Russell 2000 Value		(6.5)	(16.9)	4.3	15.4	-	13.5	13.7	0.8	(0.2)	2.4	0.7	0.8
<b>US CHOICE</b>	05/2005												
Epoch Gross Return		(9.4)	(5.4)	-	-	-	8.8	9.6	0.5	-	-	-	-
Epoch Net Return		(9.8)	(6.8)	-	-	-	7.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Russell 3000		(9.5)	(6.1)	-	-	-	7.1	8.9	0.3	0.3	2.1	0.9	0.7
<b>INTERNATIONAL SMALL CAP</b>	02/2005												
Epoch Gross Return		(8.3)	(1.7)	21.6	-	-	21.3	14.9	1.2	-	-	-	-
Epoch Net Return		(8.6)	(2.8)	20.3	-	-	19.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
S&P/Citigroup EMI EPAC Index		(6.8)	(7.2)	14.9	-	-	14.9	12.8	0.8	1.5	4.1	1.1	0.9
MSCI EAFE Small Cap (Net)		(6.2)	(11.2)	11.1	-	-	11.3	13.6	0.5	2.1	8.7	1.0	0.9
<b>GLOBAL SMALL CAP<sup>2</sup></b>	01/2003												
Epoch Gross Return		(8.0)	(3.0)	13.2	20.4	-	18.5	10.9	1.4	-	-	-	-
Epoch Net Return		(8.2)	(4.0)	12.0	19.1	-	17.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
S&P/Citigroup EMI World Index		(8.0)	(7.6)	11.2	21.2	-	19.2	12.1	1.3	(0.2)	2.0	0.9	0.9
<b>GLOBAL CHOICE</b>	10/2005												
Epoch Gross Return		(7.7)	3.0	-	-	-	17.5	11.9	1.1	-	-	-	-
Epoch Net Return		(8.0)	1.5	-	-	-	15.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
MSCI World (Gross)		(8.9)	(2.8)	-	-	-	9.0	9.6	0.5	1.5	7.2	1.1	0.8
<b>GLOBAL ABSOLUTE RETURN</b>	01/2002												
Epoch Gross Return		(5.4)	(2.5)	11.2	17.8	-	14.8	9.9	1.2	-	-	-	-
Epoch Net Return		(5.7)	(3.9)	9.6	16.1	-	13.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
S&P 500		(9.4)	(5.1)	5.9	11.3	-	4.2	12.0	0.1	1.1	12.5	0.5	0.4
MSCI World (Gross)		(8.9)	(2.8)	10.2	16.5	-	8.3	12.2	0.5	0.7	10.1	0.5	0.4
Lehman U.S. Aggregate		2.2	7.7	5.5	4.6	-	5.5	3.6	0.8	0.8	17.8	(0.4)	0.0
<b>GLOBAL EQUITY SHAREHOLDER YIELD</b>	01/2006												
Epoch Gross Return		(9.0)	(3.8)	-	-	-	11.2	9.2	0.7	-	-	-	-
Epoch Net Return		(9.3)	(4.9)	-	-	-	10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
S&P/Citigroup BMI World Index		(8.9)	(3.2)	-	-	-	8.5	10.1	0.4	0.7	3.8	0.8	0.9

See page 4 for Performance Disclosure. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

<sup>1</sup> The information provided is supplemental information only and supplements the Composite presentation which is located in the Performance Disclosure section of the End Notes.

<sup>2</sup> Effective 5/2007, the benchmark was changed from the MSCI World (Gross) Index to the S&P Citigroup EMI World Index as it is more representative of the composite's investment strategy. This change has been applied retroactively.

# Preventing Crisis, Managing Crisis, Profiting from Crisis

By William W. Priest, CEO, CIO and Portfolio Manager

As David Rosenberg of Merrill Lynch so aptly states in a recent note, the investment community has recently transitioned from crisis prevention mode to crisis management mode. In Rosenberg's view, crisis prevention at the Fed began last August 17th with the expansions of the discount window, and ended on March 11th of this year with the unveiling of the new Term Securities Lending Facility. With the inception of this policy, an attitude of crisis management took shape: a recognition that the troubles we had hoped to avoid had already come to pass. A recent – and dramatic – manifestation of this reality was the sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan following the near liquidation of Bear's equity value.

Going forward, we can expect to see more of the same. So it will be crucial for investment professionals to understand both the dynamics of our current crisis and the tools with which it is being managed. In this regard, one must keep a close eye – as always – on the actions of the Fed.

The central issue is this: the Fed and other central banks can solve a liquidity problem, but they cannot solve a solvency problem. Today's crisis is rooted in solvency. When the market price of Bear Stearns, an 85 year-old firm, can go from \$80 per share to \$10 per share in the span of one week, one is guaranteed to have a crisis of solvency and a crisis of confidence, which adds up to a crisis that the Fed alone cannot manage. Fueling this scenario is the fact that the investment community has lost faith in the balance sheets of the large investment banks and the financial sector in general: an outlook that, in our opinion, is fully warranted. The accounting for assets is opaque, not subject to "mark to market" in many cases, and leaves management too much discretion in pricing their assets.

To gain additional insight into these and other contributing factors, it is helpful to take a broader view. For some time now, we have written about "dual economies": the real economy and the financial economy that, together, are two sides of the same coin. Currently, both economies are going through massive adjustments. But, for the time being, the changes in the financial economy (i.e. solvency issues) are what should concern us most.

Fortunately, we can refer back to a valuable historical precedent in our attempts to make sense of the current state of the financial economy. In 1932, our country found itself at the peak of a financial crisis that was not entirely dissimilar to the one we are facing today. (Indeed, the IMF recently stated that "the U.S. was facing its worst financial crisis since the 1930's.") It was at this time that FDR uttered his famous words: "We have nothing to fear but fear itself." This statement was made in response to an economic landscape characterized by a 40% unemployment rate among working age adults and a run on the banks. In response, FDR reopened the banks under new legislation, and soon there were more deposits than withdrawals, signaling that the financial crisis had peaked. While the crisis in the real economy would take longer to rectify, this financial element was being addressed.

The point worth considering here is that the financial crisis in FDR's time was similar to the crisis in ours. In each case, economic instability is or was present in both the financial and real economies. Leverage was present in his day just as it is in ours. The crucial difference is that we have yet to hear the equivalent of FDR's paradigm-shifting 1932 speech.

Signs exist, however, that progress is being made. Charts 1 and 2 show the TED spread<sup>1</sup> since last June and a longer time period as well. As the reader can see, the spreads have narrowed from the peak of last summer but are still not normal. This spread can be seen as a measure of the severity of the liquidity crisis – a narrowing of the spread signals a willingness of financial intermediaries to lend to one another; a widening signals the opposite desire. The Fed's recent bold actions are, if nothing else, an encouraging sign that they have recognized the situation's full magnitude. As in FDR's time, success will unfold slowly, but we will soon know whether or not we are on the right path. We expect to see more clarity by mid summer.

Figure 1\*





Figure 2\*



The liquidity problem should pass. Then we will deal with the solvency issue: a much bigger problem, indeed. The speed and efficacy with which the solvency issue is addressed will be dependent on both the capital adequacy of the banks and the health of the real economy. In the first instance, we are sure to hit some speed bumps: the current recession will certainly impact the banks. Will their equity be absorbed by bad debt recognition or will it be used for economic growth opportunities? So far, the former option seems more likely.

But there is a bright side to all of this. As history has given us ample reason to believe, the world – which includes the world's economy – always finds a way to recover. So, too, will our financial system, but only after the necessary amount of time has passed. The financial system must regain its equilibrium and the consumer must adapt to lower housing values and a difficult job environment, which will likely take several quarters to occur. When the TED spread has returned to normal levels for several consecutive months and housing prices have bottomed, the financial economy will be in the position to reverse its downward spiral. Only then will debt-to-value ratios normalize.

As these adjustments occur, investment opportunities will resurface, made visible through the prism of free cash flow analysis. Look for firms that have little or no debt and that generate free cash flow year in and year out. These are the companies that truly understand what "cost of capital" means. In particular, seek out management teams who understand and utilize the golden rule of free cash flow deployment: When a firm can earn its cost of capital or higher, it should make acquisitions or reinvest in its business. When a firm cannot do so, it should return excess free cash flow to shareholders through higher cash dividends, share repurchases or debt reductions.

In conclusion, there is reason for both hope and caution in times of crisis such as these. For some final words of insight, we can turn to another highly quotable American who, like FDR, had an unusual ability to both inspire and instruct. Benjamin Franklin once said: "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Having shortchanged our economy on its much-needed "ounce," it is now our task to supply the extra "pounds." Having passed the point of effective crisis prevention, we must now rely on crisis management to find and administer the best possible cure.

<sup>1</sup> The price difference between three-month futures contracts for U.S. Treasuries and three-month contracts for Eurodollars having identical expiration months (<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tedsread.asp>)

## Key Personnel

## EMILY BAKER

*Portfolio Manager & Senior Analyst*  
Vanderbilt University, BA, MBA  
**Years experience: 19**

## ADAM BORAK

*Chief Financial Officer*  
UPenn, Wharton School, BS  
**Years experience: 19**

## RONAN J. BURKE

*Public Funds Director*  
Dublin City University, BBS  
**Years experience: 21**

## J. PHILIP CLARK

*Executive Vice President & Head of Client Relations*  
Yale University, BS  
**Years experience: 27**

## DINA DICENSO, Ph.D.

*Senior Associate & Analyst*  
University of Arizona, BA  
Northeastern University, MSF  
Fordham University, Ph.D.  
**Years experience: 10**

## KATHLEEN POWERS DUNLAP

*Corporate Plans Director*  
University of San Francisco, BS  
**Years experience: 28**

## ANDREA TASKER GLOGOFF

*Consultant Relations Director*  
Colgate University, BA  
**Years experience: 14**

## KENNETH N. HIGHTOWER, Ph.D.

*Director, Quantitative Research & Risk Management*  
University of North Carolina, BA, Ph.D.  
**Years experience: 11**

## THOMAS HU

*Senior Associate, Quantitative Research*  
National Taiwan University, BS, LL.B.  
Columbia University, MS  
**Years experience: 5**

## JANET K. NAVON

*Portfolio Management & Senior Analyst*  
Georgetown University, BS  
Columbia University, MBA  
**Years experience: 27**

## DAVID N. PEARL

*Executive Vice President, Head of U.S. Equities & Portfolio Manager*  
UPenn, BS  
Stanford University, MBA  
**Years experience: 25**

## THOMAS PERNICE

*Client Service Director*  
Stony Brook University, BA  
**Years experience: 27**

## WILLIAM W. PRIEST, CFA, CPA

*CEO, CIO & Portfolio Manager*  
Duke University, BA  
Wharton School, MBA  
**Years experience: 43**

## JOHN P. REDDAN, CFA

*Senior Analyst*  
Siena College, BA  
Columbia University, MBA  
**Years experience: 23**

## ERIC SAPPENFIELD

*Portfolio Manager & Senior Analyst*  
Stanford University, BA  
UCLA, MBA  
**Years experience: 22**

## DAVID J. SIINO, CFA

*Analyst*  
Hofstra University, BA  
Baruch College, MBA  
**Years experience: 10**

## MARK H. STRAUSS

*Head of U.S. Trading*  
Oneonta State University of NY, BA  
Pace University, MBA  
**Years experience: 22**

## TIMOTHY T. TAUSSIG

*President & COO*  
Dartmouth College, BA  
**Years experience: 29**

## JEFFREY M. ULNESS

*Sub-Advisory Relations Director*  
University of ND, BA & JD  
Georgetown University, LL.M.  
**Years experience: 22**

## RICHARD WATT

*Global Portfolio Management*  
University of Edinburgh, MA  
**Years experience: 26**

## MICHAEL A. WELHOELTER, CFA

*Portfolio Manager, Quantitative Research & Risk Management*  
Colgate University, BA  
**Years experience: 22**

## T. JON WILLIAMS, Ph.D., CFA

*West Coast Director*  
Arizona State University, BA  
UCLA, Ph.D.  
**Years experience: 20**

## CHRIS H. WOLTERS, CFA

*Senior Analyst*  
University of Delaware, BME  
New York University, MBA  
**Years experience: 18**

1. Presentation of the Firm—Epoch Investment Partners, Inc. became a registered investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 in June, 2004. Performance from 4/01 through 5/04 is for Epoch's investment team and accounts while at Steinberg Priest & Sloane Capital Management, LLC. For the period 7/94 through 3/01 Bill Priest managed the accounts while at Credit Suisse Asset Management and was the only individual responsible for selecting the securities to buy and sell. Epoch Investment Partners has the books and records supporting the performance of this track record and will provide these records upon request. Epoch Investment Partners, Inc. claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®).

2. Composite Structure—Epoch's Composites include all tax-exempt and taxable portfolios above \$500,000 in size and are generally managed relative to applicable market index. Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Portfolios within the U.S. Small Cap Value Composite are managed relative to the Russell 2000 and Russell 2000 Value Indices; portfolios within the U.S. SMID Value Composite are managed relative to the Russell 2500 and Russell 2500 Value Indices; portfolios within the U.S. Value Composite are managed relative to the Russell 1000 and Russell 1000 Value Indices; portfolios within the Balanced Composite are managed relative to a blended benchmark consisting of 50% S&P 500 and 50% Lehman U.S. Aggregate Indices; portfolios within the Global Small Cap Composite are managed relative to the S&P/Citigroup EMI World Index; portfolios within the U.S. All Cap Value are managed relative to the Russell 3000 and Russell 3000 Value Indices (Effective 7/1/06, the U.S. All Cap Value Composite has been redefined to reflect only those discretionary accounts managed by the All Cap Value Team and following the respective All Cap Value model. As a result, all accounts which are not managed by the All Cap Value Team and have specified client risk preferences have been removed); portfolios within the Global Absolute Return Composite are managed relative to the S&P 500, Lehman U.S. Aggregate, and MSCI World (Gross) Indices; portfolios within the International Small Cap Composite are managed relative to the S&P/Citigroup EMI EPAC Index and the MSCI EAFE Small Cap (Net) Index; portfolios within the U.S. Choice Composite are managed relative to the Russell 3000 Index; portfolios within the Global Choice Composite are managed relative to the MSCI World (Gross) Index; portfolios within the Global Equity Shareholder Yield Composite are managed relative to the S&P/Citigroup BMI World Index. Portfolios within the Global All Cap Composite are managed relative to the MSCI World (Net) Index; the Global All Cap Composite contained 100% non-fee-paying portfolio(s) as of December 31, 2007.

3. Composite Creation Dates—U.S. All Cap Value, Balanced, Global Absolute Return, Global Small Cap, U.S. Small Cap Value, U.S. Value; June 2004; International Small Cap; February 2005; U.S. Choice; May 2005; Global Choice; October 2005; Global Equity Shareholder Yield; January 2006; U.S. SMID Cap Value; September 2006.

4. Risk Statistics source—Epoch Investment Partners. The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year. Sharpe ratio is a

measure of absolute risk adjusted return developed by Professor William Sharpe. It divides the excess return of an account above cash returns by the Standard Deviation of the excess return to determine the reward per unit of risk. Information Ratio is measure of relative risk-adjusted return. It is determined by dividing excess return by Tracking Error. Alpha is a measurement of the expected residual return adjusted for the account Beta. Beta is a quantitative measure of the volatility of the account relative to the account benchmark. R-squared is a measure of how closely an account's performance correlates with the performance of the account benchmark, ranging from 0, indicating no correlation, to 1, indicating perfect correlation. Market Statistics source: Standard & Poor's, Frank Russell Company, Morgan Stanley Capital International, Lehman Brothers and Epoch Investment Partners, Inc. Composite-level risk statistics are calculated using monthly rates-of-return. Statistics calculated using a sample of less than 36 months can be considered a less reliable estimate of the characteristic's true value.

5. Total Return Methodology and Fee Structure—Returns are presented gross and net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Composite performance [Global Absolute Return, Global Small Cap, International Small Cap, Global Choice, Global Equity Shareholder Yield] is presented net of foreign withholding taxes on dividends, interest income, and capital gains. Withholding taxes may vary according to the investor's domicile. Returns may include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. A fee schedule is an integral part of a complete presentation and is described in Part II of the firm's ADV, which is available upon request. Net of fee returns reflect the deduction of the highest annual management fee, payable quarterly in arrears. Net-of-fee performance reflects the compounding effect of such fees. Generally, the highest fee payable for an Epoch managed equity portfolio is 1.0% of assets, annually, with the exception of Global and Non-U.S. which is 1.1% and Absolute Return Services which is 1.5% of assets.

6. Significant Cashflow Policy - Effective January 1, 2006, our significant cash flow policy has been redefined as in excess of 25% of the portfolio market value. This policy amendment will not be applied retroactively. Prior to January 1, 2006, composite policy required the temporary removal of any portfolio incurring a client initiated significant cash inflow or outflow of 10% or greater of portfolio market value. The temporary removal of such an account occurs at the beginning of the month in which the significant cash flow occurs and the account re-enters the composite the next full month (assuming the cash flow has been fully invested - as determined by Epoch Investment Partners, Inc.). This policy is not applied to the advised Epoch mutual funds (within the U.S. All Cap Value, International Small Cap and Global Equity Shareholder Yield Composites), U.S. Choice, Global Choice and U.S. SMID Value Composites. Additional information regarding the treatment of significant cash flows is available upon request.

7. Different methods can be applied to the calculation of performance data. Periods over one year are annualized. Additional information regarding policies for calculating and reporting returns is available upon request.

8. Past performance is not indicative of future results. All information is calculated in USD. An account could incur losses as well as gains.

9. To receive a complete list and description of Epoch Investment Partners, Inc. composites and/or presentation that adheres to the GIPS® standards, contact Jason Root at 212-303-7200, or write Epoch Investment Partners Inc., 640 Fifth Avenue, 18th Floor, New York, NY 10019, or send an email to info@eipny.com.

## EPOCH Investment Partners, Inc.

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